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Conflict of Interest in the Board Room -
Misconduct "Market Discipline" 
Cannot Kill 
J Ust as in hemlines, there are fashions in legal scholar-ship. One of the current trends emanating from the 
"Chicago school" of law and 
economics is the belief that "market 
forces" serve as an adequate deter-
rent to conflict of interest transac-
tions by corporate executives. 
This view is held not only by 
academics, who might otherwise be 
forgiven, but has been adopted by 
influential federal judges and at least 
one member of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
The theory, briefly stated (usually, 
a 20-page heavily footnoted law re-
view article is required), is that a con-
stellation of market forces disciplines 
corporate directors and officers so 
that they do not seek undue personal 
gain while managing their busines-
ses. 
To these theorists, the world is 
made up of markets. First, there is a 
market for goods and services, where 
companies shop for the stuff which 
makes companies go. Second, there 
is market for capital , where com-
panies shop for money and investors 
willing to put their finances at risk. 
There is also a market for managerial 
labor, where companies shop for high 
level executives, and most signific-
antly, where managers shop for high 
level jobs. 
How do these markets operate to 
alter human nature? Well, say the 
theorists, if managers extract too 
much personal gain from the busi-
ness, either in the fonn of excess com-
pensation or through self-dealing 
business relationships , the value of 
the firm will be diminished and the 
market for capital will close down -
lenders and investors will not be 
willing to infuse growth money and 
the managers will therefore find 
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themselves in a stagnant business, 
Thus, managers have a strong incen-
tive to curb their short-term oppor-
tunistic instincts, so that their 
businesses will grow and provide 
them with greater wealth in the long 
term , 
Alternatively, the Chicagoans say, 
managers regard themselves as 
commodities tradeable in the market 
for managerial labor, where the best 
jobs are a scarce and highly desira-
ble resource. If managers are to pos-
ition themselves to trade upward for 
a better opportunity in Job #2, they 
must first maximize shareholder 
wealth in Job # 1. Since excessive 
self-dealing is inconsistent with 
shareholder wealth, ambitious man-
agers will not engage in conflicts of 
interest, thus (1) limiting the likeli-
hood that their businesses will be-
come takeover targets and (2) en-
hancing their long term chances for 
a better job, 
Moreover, this market discipline 
is enforced both by co-managers and 
by subordinate employees, all of 
whom, recognizing that their op-
timum compensation potential is 
earnings-based, have shareholder 
wealth as their predominant goal. 
Anyone who has spent any time 
around business executives will of 
course respond, "Phooey." And re-
cent empirical research confirms 
that the world does not operate as 
the theorists would predict - that 
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business executives in a position to 
do so in fact chronically and re-
peatedly structure their corporate 
dealings to enhance their immediate 
personal or family gain. In both pri-
vately held and publicly held 
businesses, the existence of one or 
more "material conflict of interest 
transactions" each year is the rule, 
rather than the exception. 
One might not find this surprising 
in non-publicly held enterprises. 
After all, one reason entrepreneurs 
incorporate is to maximize personal 
gain while minimizing personal risk. 
So when the Wall Street Journal re-
ported that, while Crazy Eddie, Inc. 
was still a private company, Eddie 
Antar, its principa.\ shareholder and 
CEO, had "virtually [used] the com-
pany as a private bank," granting 
himself $470,000 in interest-free 
loans, paying various family mem-
bers $75,000 annual stipends, ex-
tending millions of dollars of credit 
to a son-in-Iaw's business venture 
(supplying cassettes to Crazy Eddie) 
and guaranteeing the six-digit 
(never repaid) borrowings of still 
another relative, it was no great 
shock. "Sure there were a lot of 
third-party dealings and tax shel-
ters," said a company spokesman. 
"As a private corporation, Eddie's 
wasn 't dedicated to enriching the 
coffers of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice." So long as the IRS didn 't com-
plain, "Crazy" Eddie Antar was not 
only not crazy, he was just playing 
the All-American game of grabbing 
everything he could grab. 
But what of those publicly-held 
companies where the managers, in 
theory at least, work for sharehol-
ders other than themselves and are 
thus subject to the soul-cleansing (or 
at least conduct-limiting) market 
forces extolled by the Chicago 
school? Do conflict of interest trans-
actions occur there too? Anecdotal 
evidence is abundantly in the affir-
mative. 
Item: DeLaurentiis Entertainment 
Group, which went public in 1986, 
and is now deep in debt - its movie 
library and production studio on the 
block to payoff its bankers - is still 
run as if it were private. Its CEO, 
famed director Dino DeLaurentiis, 
hired his daughter as head of pro-
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duction (annual salary $400,000), 
and his girlfriend as head of the 
studio. According to Forbes 
Magaz ine, he also authorized pro-
duction deals with his son-in-law, a 
videocasette deal in Spain and Por-
tugal with a second son-in-law and 
a distribution deal with a brother in 
Italy. DEG made $27 million in loans 
(as yet unrepaid) to two private com-
panies owned by the DeLaurentiis 
family, and another of $8.4 to De-
Laurentiis himself. 
Item: The directors of Allegheny 
International - once a Fortune 500 
company, now in Chapter 11 - have 
been named in a shareholders' suit 
alleging that they approved for 
themselves and several AI execu-
tives $32.3 million in low-interest 
(2%) loans; that they approved 
"without any valid business pur-
pose" a $16 million purchase of a 
controlling interest in a failing 
Florida condominium complex in 
which former Chairman Robert J . 
Buckley and other top AI officers 
had substantial financial interests; 
that they caused the company to pur-
chase a multimillion dollar hotel and 
install as its manager (and resident 
of a $1 million penthouse suite) Buck-
ley's son, who had no hotel experi-
ence; and that they permitted other 
excesses, including the maintenance 
of a multiple-jet "Allegheny Air 
Force" for frequent executive per-
sonal use and at least two fancy 
homes - a "magnificient" Tudor 
mansion in one of Pittsburgh's best 
neighborhoods (cost after furnish-
ing, nearly $1 million) and a resort 
condominium bordering an exclu-
sive golf course (cost approximately 
$500,000) - ostensibly used for "dig-
nitary" entertainment, but fre-
quently used for Buckley's personal 
enjoyment. 
Business Week, questioning how 
AI's prestigious, "independent" 
board could have let these things 
happen, noted that, of the nine out-
side directors on the 14-man board, 
one was the president of AI's lead 
bank, and four others had received 
substantial consulting fees beyond 
their normal directors' fees. One of 
them, former Secretary of State 
Alexander M. Haig, had secured a 
contract to provide advice "in the 
area of safety and protection de-
vices" at $10,000 per day up to five 
days' work each year. 
Item: Diamond Shamrock Corp., 
"an energy conglomerate with large, 
persistent losses, " has recently been 
castigated for investing in a semen-
producing prize bull in which Dia-
mond's CEO, William H. Bricker, 
also had a stake; for maintaining a 
$9 million working farm used 
primarily by Diamond executives as 
a luxury pheasant hunting retreat; 
for using one of Diamond's five cor-
porate jets to ferry Bricker and his 
family regularly to their ranch in 
Montana and for making a later-
abandoned $300,000 investment 
(against the staff's recommendation) 
in a biotechnology company par-
tially owned by and substantially in-
debted to a Diamond director. Appa-
rently, the proceeds of Diamond's in-
vestment were used to payoff the 
debt. 
Item: Hom & Hardart Co., a food 
service conglomerate which lost 
$28.4 million in FY 1986, has been 
involved in a number of conflict of 
interest transactions in recent years 
with Barry Florescue, its Chairman 
and CEO, and Donald Schupak, vice 
chairman. Lear TCB, Inc. , which is 
jointly owned by Florescue and 
Schupak, has charged Hom & Har-
dart $1.2 million since 1984 for use 
of two corporate jets. Shareholders 
have challenged Florescue and 
Schupak's sale to Horn & Hardart of 
two regional Bojangles franchise 
holding companies for $1 each plus 
assumption of $8.5 million in 
liabilities, claiming the acquisition 
amounts to a waste of corporate as-
sets. Florescue-controlled entities 
own the property and collect sub-
stantial rents annually for eight of 
Horn & Hardart's restaurant sites 
and an office facility. 
Item: Mobil Oil Co. president and 
CEO William Tavoulareas has 
gained considerable notoriety for 
Mobil's multi-million dollar no-bid 
dealings with Atlas Maritime Co., an 
international shipping company in 
which Tavoulareas's son Peter was 
a principal. Tavoulareas's libel suit 
against the Washington Post for re-
porting that he had "set [Peter] up" 
in the venture was recently dismis-
sed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
with the observation that the facts 
surrounding the various Atlas trans-
actions reflected an "[abundance of] 
evidence of nepotism in favor of 
Peter." 
It is by no means clear that all, or 
even any, of the conflict of interest 
transactions described above im-
pacted adversely on share value or 
were, in the sense that reviewing 
courts construe the term, "unfair" to 
the involved corporations. What en-
riched the executives may also have 
benefitted their companies. But it is 
clear that, in these widely-traded 
closely-scrutinized public com-
panies, where the Chicagoans' 
"market forces" presumably work 
most efficiently, conflicts of interest 
- some highly suspect - were still 
present. 
I recently dug more deeply to dis-
cover the extent to which conflict of 
interest transactions occur in busi-
ness. Using documents filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion during June 1986, I reviewed the 
disclosure statements of 44 com-
panies about to go public for the first 
time. Of those 44 companies, 43 of 
them (or 97.7%) had engaged during 
the preceding three years in busi-
ness transactions in which their of-
ficers or directors had received be-
nefits at least $60,000 in excess of 
their routine compensation. Seven-
teen (38.6%) had rented office space 
or equipment from entities control-
led by their executives. Nineteen 
(43.2%) had made substantial loans 
to their executives, mostly at below-
market rates and seldom secured. 
Twenty-two (50%) had paid consult-
ing fees to outside directors for ser-
vices ranging from investment bank-
ing to lawyering to advertising 
copywriting. Twenty-four (54.5%) 
had engaged in other types of con-
flict of interest transactions, includ-
ing the sale of franchises, supply 
contracts, the guaranty of business 
loans, office sharing arrangements, 
technology licensing agreements 
and the sale of property. 
Some of these companies were un-
doubtedly so closely held as to in-
voke the "Crazy Eddie" defense, but 
others were not. Companies with 
several hundred shareholders can 
still, under SEC guidelines, be "non-
public." 
The news was not much better for 
the publicly-held companies. I re-
viewed the 1986 filings for 48 such 
companies and found that, of them, 
37 (77%) had engaged during their 
most recent operating year in report-
able conflict of interest transactions. 
Seventeen (35.4%) had leased prop-
erty from their managers; eight 
(16.7%) had made below-market 
loans; sixteen (33.3%) had paid sub-
stantial consulting fees to their out-
side directors and 21 (43.8%) had 
found other ways to provide special 
enrichment to their officers and di-
rectors or their families . 
The amounts involved in these 
deals were not peanuts either. In the 
private companies, annual rental 
payments to insiders ran as high as 
$982,000 annually; "consulting fees" 
ranged as high as $606,000 and 
executive loans reached $339,000. In 
the publicly-held companies, con-
sulting fees ran to $2,462,008 and 
below-market executive loans as 
high as $840,000. 
Can it be merely a coincidence that 
the managers of these businesses so 
frequently found the best real estate 
deal in town right in their own board 
room? That the most accomplished 
lawyer (or financial consultant, or 
public relations consultant or insur-
ance broker or "safety and protec-
tion devices" consultant) was a 
member of their own management 
team? That the best investment to be 
found paying the highest return 
turned out to be a below-market un-
secured loan made to one of their 
own executives? 
What's wrong with this picture? If 
it is true that the markets for capital 
and for managerial labor work as ef-
ficiently as the Chicago schoolers 
seem to think, then it must be the 
market for goods and services which 
is out of whack - a heretical thought. 
It may just be that the marketeers 
of the Midwest are wrong in their 
theory. In fact there are many forces 
less esoteric than "market" forces 
which operate to limit conflicts of in-
terest in business - IRS rules, SEC 
rules and state rules requiring ap-
proval of self-dealing transactions 
by "disinterested" members of the 
board. The problem is, human na-
ture being what it is, none of them 
seems to work. 
HAll my life people 
have been coming to 
me with plans to make 
over society and its in-
stitutions. Many of 
these plans have 
seemed to me good. 
Some of them have 
been excellent. All of 
them have had one 
fatal defect. They have 
assumed that human 
nature would behave 
in a certain way. If it 
would behave in that 
way almost anyone of 
these plans would 
work, but if human na-
ture would behave in 
that way not any of the 
plans would be neces-
sary, for in that case 
society and its institu-
tions would naturally 
reform themselves to 
perfection. 
- Elihu Root 
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